How Corona could change the future of Aviation

How perfect aviation was just weeks before: the new corona virus (SARS COV-2) seemed to be contained to be local chinese problem only, global growth seemed to be unaffected. If the virus could have a negative impact, then it would be just a very temporary dip like we saw when SARS (SARS COV-1) appeared in 2003. Then, growth rates quickly came back to what they have been before.

For now, we should not count that to happen again after worldwide infections with the virus have dropped significantly. The timing of this, of course, is the first open question: some state leaders seem to think they can beat the virus by ignoring it and tell their people they should not be cutie-pies just because they do not get enough ventilators…

But let us think what will happen after the crisis – whenever that may be:

A lot of airlines will cease operations indefinitely – not just temporarily as just right now. Even if many governments will throw a lot of money onto their national airlines, I think it is fair to assume that many will not survive in the long term, just because they lost too much money meanwhile.

But what is more important is what CEO’s of large and strong airlines say these days. CEO’s of airlines which should survive the crisis. Let’s take a look at Lufthansa, Delta Air Lines and United.

Lufthansa’s Carsten Spohr said these days that after the crisis his airlines group will not see the scale as it had before. Spohr is sure that after the corona crisis the whole aviation industry will be a different one: “We have a smaller Lufthansa group ahead of us.”

As for Delta, CFO Paul Jacobson already said: “We’re going to be smaller coming out of this” and Henry Harteveldt, president and founder of Atmosphere Research said he would not be surprised if that will be also true for United and American. In fact, also United CEO Oscar Munoz and president Scott Kirby warned in a letter to employees, that “our airline and our workforce will have to be smaller than it is today.”

If this will be true, and not just for these particular carriers but for the whole industry around the globe: what does it mean?

First: less airplanes in the sky. The question is then, relative to today, where airlines parked up to 95% of their fleet, which airplanes they will fly then. Will they put their older aircraft out of storage again or will they grow only modestly, getting only the younger aircraft out of storage and then grow slowly with deliveries of new aircraft? That depends on if they can pay for new aircraft and if the aircraft they own today are owned by themselves.

Airlines with better financials may take new aircraft and benefit from lower operating and maintenance costs. On the other hand, if they own their aircraft without any debt on them and oil prices are staying low, it could be more economical for some time to put at least some of the MD80, B757 and B767 out of storage again.

Why is that an important question?

First, it is important for the fight against global warming – at least politically. As most sectors were able to cut their CO₂ output in the last years, aviation was not. In fact, the goal of climate neutral growth from this year on was always questionable at best. Now, with the corona crisis, CO₂ output this year will fall compared to last year for sure. It will probably take some years to reach the level of 2019 again. And it will take longer, the more of the older jets now in storage will be replaced with A350, B787, B777-9, A320neo, B737MAX, A220 and the likes.

But the question is also important for the ones like Airbus and Boeing of course. If airlines let their old aircraft in the desert, aircraft production will soar again as new aircraft are needed for the growth after the crisis. But if older aircraft be flown again, we probably will never see the rates of 60 aircraft a month for the A320neo or B737MAX.

For the engine industry, it would be more of a financial problem when all the old(er) aircraft will be scrapped. Too many engines would then be available for part-out, flooding the aftermarket with used parts and destroying the then anyway smaller, but today very profitable business with spare parts.

Sales of the engine industry would then be heavily torted to the new engine business, which is not profitable at best, not to say loss-making.

So the profitability of the engine industry would be hurt badly -  or the industry would have to change their business model by shifting profits from the aftermarket business to the new engine sales. Of course that could only happen if all engine makers would agree to that and if airlines up to a certain point as well.

In case the profitability of the engine makers is hurt too much, they would not be able for adequate research for the next generation of engines that would be needed for an A320neo or B737MAX successor. The corona crisis could have shifted the arrival of these new aircraft the right for a few years now anyway as also Airbus and Boeing will probably have to scale back their R&D costs in the next few years.

So a good thing - a more modern and CO₂ efficient fleet in the short and mid term - could lead to a bad thing in the more distant future: later introduction of breakthrough technologies.

No clean sheet B757 / B767 succussor!

I refer to the story in herald.net reporting from the Boeing Investor Day on May, 21^st 2014. Reading the article we must come to the conclusion that a clean sheet design B757/767 successor will not happen for some time.

After the financial B787 debacle, which is now between $23 and $25 billion in the reds and with a costly B777X program ahead nobody in the Boeing upper management will have the will to try to sell another technical and financial adventure to the shareholders.

One could say that Boeing now has all the learning about how to develop and produce a fiber carbon aircraft and the development of the B777X wing would give further experience and would lower the risk. But this aircraft – a B757/767 successor – would have different competitors, coming partly from Boeing itself. The B737MAX-9 and the A321neo from the lower side, the B787-8 and a A330neo from the upper side. Of course, the B737MAX-9 and the A321neo would not be able to do the critical B757 missions and the A330neo and the B787-8 are optimized for longer ranges and thus would not offer optimized costs for, say, a 4000nm mission. But this market segment alone, which can not be served by the B737MAX-9 and the A321neo, would be too small  to present a business case with another $10-$15 billion investment upfront.

Sales prices would also be a problem with a A330neo, which, with a 2018 EIS by 2025 could have written down development costs and could be given to customers for prices we see today for the baseline A330 (escalated by inflation, of course).

Boeing yesterday made clear (as Airbus did before) that future aircraft will (for the foreseeable future) only see incremental developments rather than revolutionary designs. The plans from Airbus for an electric regional aircraft might be the only exception, but we have to wait another few years to see if this concept will really become reality.

Is there a demand for a B757/B767 successor? Yes, of course! Will Boeing sell one aircraft less if they (and Airbus) don’t do it? No! And this is what counts for the shareholder. Period!

A350 overweight?

Airbus quietly unveiled new payload-range data for the three A350 models on it's website.
The A350-900 now seats 315 (was 314), but flies 350nm less: 7,750nm.
The A350-800 now seats 276 (was 270), but flies 250nm less: 8,250nm
The A350-1000 now seats 369 (was 350), but flies 400nm less: 8,000nm

As this comes about 5 months after first flight I guess it has something to do with the initial performance of the aircraft. What it is exactly we cannot know. It could be:

• higher than anticipated SFC of the Trent XWB engines
• higher aircraft weight which now became clear cannot be brought down
• aerodynamic inefficiencies

What strikes my eyes that the one more passenger in the A350-900 (for whom we suggest a generous extra weight of 300lbs including seat etc.) costs more range than the six passengers more in the -800. And the 19 extra passengers cost only 50nm more than the one passenger in the -900. Although the -1000 is structural different than the -800 and the -900 and the engines are different too, this is not really conclusive.

I guess we can expect some argueing duels between John Leahy and Randy Tinseth over these new numbers in Dubai next week. Randy will not miss out to bash the A350 for ranges that are (nominally) again not meeting Emirates range expectations (DXB-LAX) whereas "his" B777-9 will do so (although I would expect Emirates to fly these long routes with a 3 class layout with less than 350 passengers in a A350-1000). And John Leahy will try and find a way to spin something positive around these numbers...

UPDATE: in fact these numbrs are NOT NEW and where already shown in 2011, long before the first flight and probably also the SFC of the certificated Trent XWB became clear.

Paris Air Show 2013 - The Widebody Show

After the 2011 edition of the Paris Air Show was dominated by the A320neo, this year seems to be the show of the Widebodies. The usual suspects as Emirates and Qatar will surely play a major role here, as we can read here (as for Qatar) and here (as for Emirates). Although the B777X is not mentioned in the first article we can be sure that Qatar will also be one of the first customers for the then largest twin. Probably not only the B777X will get it's first orders but also the B787-10 will see a formal launch with a first wave of orders. Airbus, of course, will try not to stand by and have it's own order book filled, mainly that of the A350.
The future of the A380 could play a role in conjunction with the launch of the B777X as the seat costs of the double decker will come under pressure once the B777-9 will enter service. So we might hear what Airbus has on it's plate for 2020 and beyond, as also Ben Sandilands suggests - although he thinks that might need a little bit more time.

A new chance for the A330neo?

Qatar Airways ever communicating Akbar Al Baker yesterday told the press that Airbus would drop the A350-800. Airbus instantly denied, so nobody can tell for sure what is the fate of the smallest model of the A350 family.

Norwegian leases A340-300 to bridge the B787 gap

Norwegian will wet-lease two A340-300 from HiFly to bridge the gap until the B787-8 will arrive after the battery problem is solved. How will that impact their operations? Interestingly, the two A340 are from a batch originally flown by Singapore Airlines, then given back to Boeing in exchange for B777’s. Boeing sold them to BBAM and they leased the aircraft to Emirates. The two A340-300 are now due to arrive at HiFly. So in the end Boeing has to lease Airbus aircraft to airline customers to make up the problems with the B787.

Pricing pressure on the B737NG

Boeing for the first time acknowledged pricing pressure for the B737NG yesterday, when Ray Conner, CEO of Boeing Commercial Airplanes spoke at the JP Morgan Aerospace Conference. A synopsis can be found here at Leeham News and Comment. Read also the comment to get an insight of what readers think about how Boeing handles the battery problem of the B787.

Conner also said that there was (and is, I suppose) pricing pressure on the B737MAX, but this is normal for new aircraft entering the market.

Where the pricing pressure comes from gets clear when we look at the number of open orders and the orders Boeing has to fill until the B737MAX enters service in late 2017 and until the B737MAX

Media hype about B787 test flights

The recent media hype about the test flight(s) now allowed for narrowing the cause of the two battery incidents of the Japan Air Lines and ANA B787 is quite funny in one way. On the other side, it is a little bit sad to see that so many articles are out there in the (written) press and in the Internet and that people find it important to twitter from starting the engines from landing (God thanks!) safely again - as if now every minute the aircraft could come down because every battery could fail every minute. This coverage is not just a little bit exaggerated - it's a hype. The same people could easily comment every minute that an A380 that did not get the wing fix yet is still up in the air...
The problem for Boeing is not to keep the B787 in the air during the test flights - the problem is how to come out of the dilemma: how do they want to make FAA 1000% certain that the aircraft and the battery is safe without changing the design of the battery and surroundings or changing to another battery type. At the end there are just those two options, I guess. And then there are the "How long will it take..." questions:

• How long will that take to get the new design or a new battery?
• How long will it take to get hardware to put it into one of the test aircraft?
• And how long will it take to recertify the aircraft with that?
• How long will it take to ramp up production for the new hardware?
• How long will it take to incorporate the change into the 50 aircraft that are delivered?
• How long will it take to change the aircraft that are now ready for delivery but are waiting for the fix?
• How long and how many aircraft on the production line have to wait to get the new hardware?

I think that from those questions it gets immediately clear that Boeing has a serious problem in getting the B787 to customers waiting for the aircraft - it won't be just a few weeks that deliveries will restart.

B787 grounded...

It is not clear yet what the grounding by FAA and others means for the whole B787 program as nobody knows how long the grounding will last and what consequences will come out of the

Farnborough Preview

We are only days away from this years largest air show. There are quite a few previews out there, the most extensive I read comes from Scott Hamilton.
First at all - for me the SST mentioned in Scott's post is nothing more than a marketimg gag - at least for the flying public. The program could serve Boeing as a technology platform for military vehicles in the future, but I doubt that we will ever see a thing like that one shown in the post flying (in full scale at least).
But what about the rest?

B787-8 analysis

Lissys, the software firm providing the PIANO software, did an analysis for early-built B787's and compared the fuel burn for a 5000nm mission carrying 22 metric tonnes of payload with the B767-300ERW (where W is for winglets). The analysis showed that the B787 with it's "near EIS" performance would burn only marginal less fuel than the B767 (50.1t vs. 50.7t, a difference of 1.18%).
But as the author says, the B787 cruises at Ma0.85, where the normal cruise speed of the B767 is Ma0.8. If one lets the B767 fly at Ma0.85, that would result in a fuelburn of 62.7t, so the difference at same speed is 20%. Of course this is not the oríginal claim from Boeing (well, at least I hope so...).

But let us look further into the model of the B787 and why the fuelburn is so high relative to what one should expect from that brand-new aircraft with state-of-the-art engines.
Lissys also provides a baseline model of the B787 from 2008, where the original performance Boeing designed the aicraft for is implemented.
We can now take this baseline model and do a "Point Performance" (click this option in the "Output" box)comparison: say, at 35.000ft, Ma0.85 and a weight of 180 metric tonnes.
Here is an excerpt of the output for the baseline model:
...
 Overall Lift / Drag Ratio = 20.25
 =================================
 Total Lift Force     1765206. newtons
 Total Drag Force       87169. newtons (43584.newtons per engine)
 Engine / Airframe Performance:
 ------------------------------
 Total Fuel Flow at Thrust=Drag:       4791. kg/hr
 Specific Fuel Consumption (SFC)       0.5390 kg/hr/kgf
 Specific Air Range (SAR)              .10226 nm/kg
 Emissions Index, NOx                  11.79 g/kg.
...

And here is the same output for the "near EIS" model:
...
 Overall Lift / Drag Ratio = 19.39
 =================================
 Total Lift Force     1765206. newtons
 Total Drag Force       91049. newtons (45525.newtons per engine)
 Engine / Airframe Performance:
 ------------------------------
 Total Fuel Flow at Thrust=Drag:       5116. kg/hr
 Specific Fuel Consumption (SFC)       0.5511 kg/hr/kgf
 Specific Air Range (SAR)              .09576 nm/kg
 Emissions Index, NOx                  12.03 g/kg.
...

What do we see?

1. Lift/Drag Ratio decreased from 20.25 to 19.39. This is about 4.24%. In other words, the aircraft needs 4.24% more thrust to hold that speed (Ma0.85) with that weight (180 t) at that height (35kft).
2. Specific Fuel Consumption is 0.5511kg/hr/kgf for the near EIS model, where it was 0.539kg/hr/kgf for the 4.24% lower thrust. This is an increase of 2.2%
3. Accordingly, fuel burn per hour is almost 6.8% higher for the near EIS variant.

From all what we know about the Trent1000 and the GEnx engines, the 2.2% miss in SFC is probably a good guess for the early build B787's.
What I do not understand is the 4.24% decrease in Lift/Drag ratio. That would mean that the wings of the B787 have an aerodynamic problem. If I remember correctly, Boeing onces stated that the wing of the B747-8 (which was designed in the same timeframe) is aerodynamically better than expected, so I would guess that the B787 wing is at least as good as it was planned to be.
So I have my doubts about that part of the analysis.

On the other hand:
If we compare the baseline B787 model and the B767-300ERW, the difference in fuel burn for the 5000nm mission is about 9.5% - significant, of course, but far from being 20% as Boeing always claimed.
Even if we add 4% fuel burn for the "non-wingletted" B767-300ER, we are not near the 20%.

So there is the old wisdom, that you need the right aircraft for the right mission...

New blog on the bloglist

I added a new blog on the right side: "The Blog by Javier" - I highly recommend his entry about the break-even of the Boeing B787 programme!

GE Widebody engine SFC comparison

There is a great article at Asprire Aviation about how the B777 could evolve. There is one part which could cause misunderstandings: the fuel burn comparison between the GE90-115B on the B777-330ER/777-200ER/B777F and the GEnx that is on the B787 (GEnx-1B) and the B748-8I/F (GEnx-2B).
Daniel Tsang suggests that the GE90-115B is more efficient than the GEnx and gives SFC numbers. Now, first of all, these numbers are for Seal Level Static (MN=0) Takoff. The relevant number for long-range

Dreamliner ready to fly and "kill"

After getting FAA and EASA approval last week, yesterday also the Japanese Civil Aviation Bureau gave it's "thumbs up" for the B787-8. Launch customer All Nippon Airways can now go forward with it's plan to place the B787 into service.
After more than three long years of delays, the Dreamliner now becomes reality. And despite the first batch of aircraft will be overweight (one heard many different numbers) and the two competing engines obviously are in terms of SFC not where they should be, we can expect there now is an aircraft available that will bring economics never seen before.
The first international route ANA will fly with the B787 is Tokyo-Frankfurt.

Boeing's very ambitious plans

A lot of media articles are out there today covering what Boeing CEO McNerney told the audience at the Cowen and Co. conference: "We're gonna do a new airplane that will go beyond the capability of what the [A320]NEO can do." (Flightblogger has all the quotes)
Well, once Boeing really does a new airplane (in the A320/B737 category), it has to be better than the NEO for sure - otherwise there would be no reason to do it anyway.
But he went further on and said that the B787-10 would be a good replacement for the A330. No argument against that...then he also said, that Boeing is studying upgrades for the B777 (which is not new), but that these are targeted for after an EIS for the B737 replacement, which would be around 2020. In the meantime Boeing could do the 787-10.

??? Please what ???

After the more than three year late 787-8 Boeing should concentrate on delivering the B787-8, developing and the delivering the 787-9 before talking about three(!) new or at least heavily upgraded aircraft. Boeing lost too much credibility since the roll-out of the 787.

Interestingly Teal Group VP Aboulafia forecasted this week that Boeing would have to react against the NEO with a re-engined 737. And also Scott Hamilton reports that studies for the re-engining did not stop.
So by now nothing is certain - despite doing the B787-10, then B737RS and then 777up, it could also be 737RE, then 777up and then, if at all, the 787-10. I don't see an urgent need for the B787-10 anyway, as the 787-9 would pretty much do the job of the A330-300. The 787-10 would probably need a new undercarriage, more thrust than the Trent1000 and the GEnx are capable today and customer needs are diverging in terms of payload and range - a problem that reportedly also faces Airbus with the A350-1000.
I would be very interested to hear what major customers like Southwest are thinking about these ambitious plans...

Boeings Dreamliner under Fire

News came late yesterday that the second prototype of the B787, ZA002, landed with a cabin full of smoke in Laredo, Texas. The aircraft was en route to Harlingen, TX for trials of the nitrogen generation system. The fire broke out in the aft electronics equipment bay, the PFD and the auto throttle failed and the ram air turbine deplyed to provide enough electricity to handle th aircraft and to land it safely.
No one was injured, all test personell exited the aircraft via emergency slides.

The 787 saga of problems continues! All what can go wrong - goes wrong! Said someone "Murphy...?

What and if this latest part of the 787 saga means something really serious for the further flight test campaign and first deliveries of the aircraft remains to be seen.
In the best case there "just" was something like a short-circuit in the test equipment. Then the fire has nothing to do with the aircraft itself and the test fleet will be back in the air soon.
But it would be a lot worse if the fire has something to do with the electrical or electronical system of the aircraft.

• If it is the electrical system and some kind of short-circuit, the problem would be to find to exact location and cause of the problem. Also it would have to be examined if the cause lies in the software that controls the electrics.
• If it is the electronics itself where the fire started, it could either be a short-circuit on a circuit board or overheating of the electronics. How long then changes will take, is up in the air...and so long the aircraft won't....

In every case, the alarm bells in Rockford, Ill., where the Electrical Systems Division of Hamilton Sundstrand is located, are ringing!

Rolls Royce faces technical and legal battles

What a bad time for Rolls Royce:

August 2: Uncontained Failure on a Trent 1000 in Darby

August 30: Uncontained Failure at a Qantas B747-400 powered by RB211’s

November 4: Uncontained Failure at a Qantas A380-842 powered by Trent 900’s

Not to mention the more minor problems two B747-400 had with a RB211 (apparently a contained failure) and with fuel hydraulics.

And now: Pratt sues Rolls on patent infringement regarding the Trent 900 and Trent 1000 fan blades.

Let us recall: not long ago, in August, Rolls Royce filed a lawsuit against Pratt & Whitney, claiming that P&W would infringe their patented design for swept fan blades with their fan blades on the GP7000 and the PW1000G (and others). This case is due to go before a jury in the US in the first half of 2011.

Pratt & Whitney apparently fights back now, filing also a complaint with the U.S. International Trade Commission (ITC), which could be very damaging for Rolls Royce, as if the ITC rules in Pratt’s favor, RR could get blocked to ship any more Trent 1000’s to Boeing. And if the UK courts come to the same conclusion, RR would also have a problem to ship the Trent 900 to Airbus.

But could that be Pratt’s real interest? Not only P&W and RR would be deadly enemies forever, also Airbus and Boeing would not be happy about P&W, as deliveries for the B787 and A380 to customers with Trent 900 and 1000 engines would be (further) delayed or in the worst case impossible. As a last consequence you could expect RR to go bankrupt.

So I doubt that this is what P&W is really looking for – even if Airbus goes ahead with the A320NEO and P&W developing a version of their PW1000G Geared Turbo Fan for it without Rolls Royce, the two companies will still be tied for centuries, as the V2500 will continue to be shipped until 2015 at least and aftermarket activities will continue  - say – twenty years plus.

So what could be the real goal behind the legal actions?

My guess: P&W wants RR to “cooperate” a little bit more on the narrowbody front:

RR officially states that reengining the current Boeing and Airbus narrowbodies does not make any sense. But it sounded a little bit different until RR was officially put out of the reengining game by Airbus. And as RR has no interest to participate as  a junior partner in the GTF, RR would be out of the narrowbody market at least until a clean sheet design either by Boeing or Airbus arrives. So one can imagine that RR will do everything (legal, of course) they can do to prevent the Airbus reengining by hindering and blocking P&W’s PW1000G to be one of the –NEO engines.

I do not know how the IAE contract between Pratt, RR and the other partners looks like, but maybe RR can block an engine offering for the A320NEO by P&W – or block order conversions from the V2500 to a PW1000G once the A320NEO is officially offered to costumers.

It will be interesting to see how RR will come out of these two battles:

-          the technical battle: RR has to regain confidence on the Trent 900/1000 – and maybe the XWB

-          the legal battle with P&W

The Lufthansa Order and what it might tell us

Yesterday, Lufthansa ordered 48 aircraft to be delivered from 2012: 32 A320 family aircraft, eight A330-300 and 8 E195. When I first read the news, I wondered what that order means, when there are more efficient aircraft available in the next years (think of 787 vs. A330, CS100/300 vs. E195 or, further out, A320NEO  vs. A320(current).
To clarify the situation I would like to direct you to Jens Flottau's article in the Aviation Week:
Most of the A320 are for replacement of older A320 or the even older B737 (-300's and -500's). Swiss will get A320's and A321's, but no A319's - that makes sense, as the CS300 would be clearly more efficent. Swiss (via LH) only has ordered 30 CS100 so far, but there are 30 more options which could be converted to CS300 if needed.
So I don't think right now that the A320 order is a vote against the NEO, but it probably all depends on what Boeing does: if they would come up with a 737 replacement by 2020/21, I see LH switching from A. to B. for their (6 abreast) narrowbody fleet in the long run. The CSeries should have it's role also, not only at Swiss, but also as a Avro replacement at Brussels, maybe at Austrian, LH Italia - and who knows what happens to SAS - they would be happy to find a home in the LH Group and expressed interest in the CSeries earlier.
The question why Austrian does not get any new aircraft is sufficiently answered in the article.
Another question that struck me, is: why A330-300's! Why do they not order the B787 or the A350??? Does LH (aka Nico Buchholz) know something about these two natural candidates for A330 replacement we still do not know? Any further (and then probably significant) delay of the B787? Problems in the A350 development program? Fact is that the flight test program of the B787 has slowed down in the last two weeks (as well as the B747-8 flight tests did). Aircraft number 6 is also delayed further.
I guess we will have to wait until the Boeing Q3 earnings call until we hear what is going on there. Until then, have fun with wild guessing...