A320neo engine shortage: PWA takes all the blame - but why?

Not long ago Airbus claimed, not for the first time, that PWA GTF engines would be late for the A320neo family. his might be true (and why should Airbus lie), but what I wonder about is where are the CFM LEAP-1A engines?

Last year the LEAP-1A had a market share of roughly 60%. Looking at the first 3 months of 2026 and the deliveries of the A320neo family two things are noteworthy:

1. Overall deliveries are lower for the first three months of the year than in 2025: 81 in 2026, but 106 in 2025, so about 24% lower.

2. Looking at the market share we can see that PWA had a market share of roughly 62% for the first three months of 2026.

Can we conclude that the "real" shortage is not with PWA, but with CFM? Of course a shift in market share could also just come from the individual customer demands, which had chosen either the one or the other engine. But such a clear swing in such a short time is not normal.

And if we count the A220 as well with their 19 deliveries PWA has a lead of 69% in the Airbus narrowbody sector.

Let's see how that evolves...

A220 Stretch - to launch or not to launch...

The speculations about the official launch of a stretched A220 comes up again at regular intervals. Airbus position is that it is not a question if it will be launched bot only when…

Next spring at the latest, in the run-up to the Paris Air Show, speculation about a launch at the show will be rampant again. So let's start early, say now... what are the reasons for or against a stretched A220, what options are there in terms of engines and what could that mean for the A320neo and B737MAX successors?

To launch or not to launch?

What speaks for a stretched A220? Let's start with what no longer speaks against it: the A320neo. In the past, the popularity, the number of open orders and the profitability (for Airbus) for the A320neo were cited as the main economic obstacles to the launch of the A320neo. As soon as the A220 Stretch is announced, customers would cancel the A320neo and order the A220 instead, which is significantly more expensive to manufacture (today). However, if you look at Airbus' current order backlog, over 70% of the open orders for the A320 family are for the A321neo. The A321neo accounts for 87% of orders from 2024. The importance of the A320neo for Airbus has declined significantly in recent years and the A321neo is even more profitable to sell than the A320neo.

The next reason in favor of a launch could just as well be one against it: Boeing's situation! Boeing is still busy getting the B737MAX-7 and especially the Boeing 737MAX-10 certified by the FAA, EASA, etc. - and also the B777-9, whose EIS has just been postponed again. It is questionable whether Boeing can even provide enough resources for the certification issues while at the same time having to deal with general quality issues and now also with the strike of its unionized employees (a new offer from Boeing is out and the vote is expected in the coming week). A ramp-up of B737MAX-8 and -9 production is currently not in sight and the B787 has its own problems. Boeing will therefore lack cash flow in the next few years and the company must now urgently mobilize money on the capital market. Boeing bonds could soon have junk status. Two very different conclusions could be drawn from this situation:

a) Pro: Airbus is launching the stretched A220 to put the B737MAX-8 under even more pressure. This would force Boeing, if they were financially able to do so, to launch a successor to the B737MAX family earlier than planned. Currently, the optimal time window for a launch would be after the end of the analysis of the X-66 flights, which are currently scheduled to launch in 2028. After the first series of flights, for which the GTF engine of the A220 and Embraer E2 will power the aircraft, the CFM RISE engine may also be tested with the X-66. Boeing would then have a real comparison of the installation effects. But not before 2030! An early start to the development of a B737MAX successor by Airbus would deprive Boeing of many options, the solution would probably be a traditional "tube-and-wing" aircraft with an advanced LEAP engine and/or a PWA GTF or Rolls Royce Ultrafan variant. For Airbus, this would have the advantage of being able to wait a few years, analyze the Boeing design and meanwhile evaluate the CFM RISE engine in flight tests earlier (currently planned from 2026). This would give Airbus and the engine manufacturers more time to prepare additional technology. However, this is exactly where the first sticking point comes in: are the engine manufacturers prepared to develop two different engines in a relatively short period of time? Do they have the resources for this? Do they see a business case? It could end up with the engine manufacturers demanding a "single source" solution from Boeing, because Boeing's market share compared to Airbus would probably continue to decline.

b) Contra: from a market share perspective, Airbus has no reason to invest in the development of an A220 Stretch. The market share of the A320neo has grown steadily compared to the B737MAX in recent years, and Boeing can not and does not want to afford to launch a successor. Airbus can therefore sit back, relax and wait until Boeing takes the first step, perhaps in the early 2030s, and counter it after carefully analyzing the Boeing design.

These two scenarios have very different effects on the engine manufacturers.

In scenario a) the most likely engine variant is a further development of the PW1500G engine, similar to the further development of the PW1100G engine into the GTF Advantage. CFM, on the other hand, would probably have to make a completely new development for the A220 Stretch, as the LEAP-1B is significantly heavier and has a worse SFC than the PW1500G. It would be difficult to build a sound business case here, especially as some of the sales for the A220 Stretch would be no extra sales, but just drawn from the B737MAX.

What consequences would a A220 Stretch launch have for Airbus? I think that it will not be a "simple stretch": firstly, Airbus will use the opportunity to integrate further detailed improvements, e.g. further developed winglets, which can then also be used on the A220-100 and -300. But I think the question of whether the way the aircraft is produced will change is much more important. At present, it is not yet clear how a production rate of 10 aircraft per month could be achieved in Mirabel. The so-called pre FAL, which Airbus built in Mirabel after taking over the program based on the A320 line in Hamburg, has not led to a significant increase in production even two years later; currently only 4-5 aircraft per month are being started for assembly.

If demand for the A320neo does indeed fall further with the release of the A220 Stretch, it should be possible, for example, to convert one of the existing A320 lines in Hamburg, Toulouse or Mobile to the A220 and at the same time optimize the entire production process. This would also enhance profitability of the A220 program.

What about the consequences for Boeing? This depends on the exact positioning of the A220 Stretch: if it is placed close enough to the capacity of the B737MAX-8, Boeing would have to react as described under a). As described, this would come too early for the CFM RISE, the aircraft would probably (obviously) get a second generation LEAP engine and possibly a second option. But here lies the problem: would Pratt & Whitney or Rolls Royce be prepared to invest in a completely new development, knowing that a few years later Airbus would demand an engine that is significantly better in response, and perhaps if development has progressed far enough by then? This makes it clear that Boeing is in a dilemma.

But there could be a solution that - ironically - was close to completion a few years ago and was then shortsightedly discarded: this solution would be Embraer. A few days ago, Embraer CEO Francisco Gomes Neto confirmed that Embraer is (once again) considering developing a "big narrowbody". A new attempt at a merger between the commercial aircraft division of Embraer and BCA would have the advantage for Boeing that it would be able to face a competitor to the potential A220 Stretch without Boeing having to decide on the design and technology of the real successor to the B737MAX family. An Embraer/BCA narrowbody could initially cover the field above the E195E2 up to the (then) A220 Stretch. This would keep the market share large enough from Boeing's point of view.

Scenario b) is much easier, especially for the engine manufacturers. All have enough time to work on the next generation of aircraft and engines. The option for an Embraer/Boeing Joint Venture would be there as well. But that would most likely concentrate on the lower end of the narrowbodies and then maybe “force” Airbus t launch the A220 Stretch.

Speculation of course, all just speculation... but all major suppliers, but above all the engine manufacturers, must or should deal with all variants and prepare for them.

The Paris Air Show 2025 begins on Monday, June 16, 2025, and we will know more about how the story (of the narrowbodies) continues by Friday, June 20, 2025 at the latest.

Boeing's big gamble

A recent article by Bloomberg about the new composite wing that could replace the current wing on the A320neo, a project called “The Wing of Tomorrow” by Airbus, spurred some discussions about the future Airbus narrowbody product line and how Boeing would/could react.

The subject, as Scott Hamilton writes, is not new at all. I heard about it in 2013 for the first time. Airbus at that time thought that Bombardier would launch a CS500 (today discussed as the A220-500) and thought that the CS300 was about 5% better in economics than even advertised by Bombardier to customers. This gives us a first indication of how good an A220-500 could be, as the A220-300 has at least the same costs per seat than the A320neo, if not better. A stretched aircraft always tends to have better seat costs than the original one, so the A220-500 has better seat mile costs than the A320neo “by definition”.

If the A220-500 it would be an A320neo and B737-8 killer, as Scott Hamilton thinks, is another question though and depends on how the A220-500 exactly would look like and what the mission is an airline is looking for.

Start with the current payload-range diagrams of the A320neo and the A220-300.

Looking at the payload-range diagram we see that indeed with 165 x 220lbs per passenger = 33klbs of payload the range is in the 3400nm range.

The payload-range diagram of the A220-300 is not yet updated by Airbus (at least not for the “flying public”) and still shows around 3100nm range with 140 passengers and 149000lbf MTOW. If we believe in the Airbus claim that with the new MTOW of 156000lb range would be 3550nm we get the new range-payload line approximately as a parallel line to the old one. Now let us seat 165 in that aircraft (knowing that it would not work of course) and we see that range would fall to around 3000nm by the addition of the extra 25 passengers of payload.

To seat these 25 passenger we would need to stretch the aircraft by five rows of about 4m of 13ft. This is about the same difference in length than between the A220-100 and the A220-300.

For simplicity, let us consider that the difference in OEW between the A220-300 and a potential A220-500 with unchanged MTOW would be same as the difference between the OEW of the A22-100 and the A220-300: 4100lb. Then we would get a range of the stretched A220-500 aircraft of around 2500nm.

On one hand, this is enough for probably around 95% of all flight a A320neo of a B737-8 is used for today. On the other hand, flexibility is key for many airlines, so the limited range of an A220-500 would be a problem for many airlines.

Now we can increase the MTOW of the A220-500 to increase range.

Start with a comparison of the wing loading: the A220 wing has 112.3 square meter, the A320neo 122.6. To get to same wing loading we could increase the MTOW of the A220-500 by about 3500lb. This would increase the range by approximately 300nm to about 2800nm. The original CS300 was advertised with this range. With the same wing loading and the same generation of engines, especially with a bypass ratio that is in the same range, runway characteristics should be comparable as well then.

So would the A220-500 be a A320neo and B737-8 killer? If you definitely do not need more range than 2800nm it could be.

For Airbus, with their “Wing of Tomorrow”, this would not be such a big problem. They could do the A320.5neo++ (or whatever it will be called). For Boeing, not having a competitive product against the A220-100 and -300 to begin with, the A220-500, together with a A320.5, could turn into a bigger problem. Both aircraft would squeeze the B737-8 from both above and below, the A320.5 with better range and economics and the A220-500 with dramatically better economics.

But the ball is in Boeings court. As it looks, they have to move first, either with an aircraft that aims at the so called Middle of the Market, that is now captured by the A321XLR, but leaving the B737-8 alone. Or by replacing the MAX family soon, which could counter an A220-500 on the low end but leaving the A321XLR and even more a potential A322 alone on the playground.

Canceling the joint venture with Embraer could have been a big failure going forward, as “Boeing Brazil” could have worked on the lower end of the narrowbody product line.

Disclaimer: these thoughts are just easy considerations without going through all the (engineering) steps necessary. But it gives us a hint where the different aircraft are relative to each other.

5X – what 5X?

During the last weeks Aviation Week had a few articles (here and here) about an alleged new Boeing widebody aircraft code-named -5X. More or less a NMA reloaded, this aircraft would be targeting the A330neo family, but in turn as well the 787-8/9.

Stop –say what? The 787 is right now not selling like hot cakes, but the A330neo not as well and the main reason is COVID-19, although also without the pandemic both aircraft would see lower production rates today than until 2019. So where is the point in developing a new aircraft there? The NMA, which was not able to produce a business case for Boeing, was shelved and was probably almost the same aircraft. Part of the problem back then was that the engine companies did not see the market as attractive as Boeing (officially) did and both CFMI and P&WA only wanted to develop an engine as a sole source.

So where is the reason to believe that now, two years later, it actually looks better for an aircraft like this?

The only thing Boeing should concentrate on is a new Single Aisle aircraft family! If Boeing would start an aircraft like -5X now with an EIS not before 2027, themselves as well as the engine companies would not have the resources to be able to counter an A320neo++ family with a new wing and engines that will then get a performance improvement package from the -5X engine(s). Also, as Scott Hamilton from Leeham writes today, the A220-500 is only a question of when, not if. So the lower end of the B737MAX would get increasing pressure once the - 500 is on the market. The B737MAX would be dead then, "killed" from the A220-550 from the lower end and from the A320neo++ and A321neo++ from the upper end – and in turn BCA would be dead!

But is it possible to design an aircraft family that can compete with the A220-500 on the lower end and a future (possible) A322? No, but the Airbus narrowbody aircraft family has two wings, two fuselages and different engines as well. So a clever scaling of the fuselage and the wings could do the trick for Boeing. Starting with the larger (6 abreast) family, starting just north of today's 737MAX-8 up to a A322 sized aircraft. After that scaling fuselage and wings down to a 5 abreast aircraft with a second or third generation of the PW1500G for example.

Just my 2 cents of course - but I see less than these 2 cents of value in a -5X! 

Next (new) airplanes

After NMA is obviously no more, some people seem to believe, that Boeing could instead bring a refreshed B757 or B767 to market.

Is that viable? No, I would say, at least not for passenger traffic!

Both aircraft are late 1970’s aircraft, thus about ten years older than the A320ceo. Both were the first narrow- and widebodies with a two-crew-glass-cockpit.

But: the design of the airframe and the wing keep to be from these days, aside from getting winglets, saving up to 4% fuel burn.

So a new wing, along with the new engines, would be inevitable. Along with that goes a new center wing box. That means typically at least 50% of the development costs of a complete new aircraft.

But it does not stop here. A new cockpit with all the technology of B787 or B777X would be needed to make these airplanes attractive to airlines.

Now to the engines: for the B767 GEnx engines would be the likely candidate, and here the -2B version, as it has the right thrust and also a bleed air system. The GEnx though is an engine which was designed in the early 2000’s. The concept would me more than 20 years old if Boeing would decide to start development now with an EIS in 4 to 5 years. The basic aircraft concept would then be 50 years old.

The same is basically true for the B757: with the difference that there would not be an “off the shelf” engine with the right thrust available. But would any engine company spend $1bn for a brand new engine for a 50 year old fuselage? CFM/GE and PWA for sure not, as they have their engines in place on the A321XLR. So only RR could have an interest, but with todays news that they are laying off some 8000 people and delaying the development of their Ultra Fan this is more than questionable. In fact, I see RR in danger as they are so heavily exposed to the widebody market, which, in the opinion of all experts, will be the last market segment to recover.

So there won’t be a new aircraft from Boeing for the time being. CEO Dave Calhoun though says that the “true differentiator” of Boeing’s next aircraft will be “the way we manufacture and the way we engineer, as opposed to the… design of the airplane itself” (quote from the Flightglobal article). What does that mean? As I understand it: the B737MAX will stay the B737MAX, Boeing will (just) look into the cost of production. Well, hopefully they will get it right…

What does that mean for Airbus? A great opportunity, if they are bold and can get money in a similar manner as Boeing raised $25bn on the capital market. If Airbus can raise enough money with a lower yield than Boeing did, Airbus could use that money to invest in the so-called A320neo++, where the A320neo and the A321neo will get a new and larger composite wing and a new cockpit and both would be stretched to a “A320.5” (between todays A320 and A321) and a A322. Then Airbus would also need to develop the A220-500 and would have the perfect product line for the rest of the century and the early 2030’s.

Boeing meanwhile is stuck with the problems of the B737MAX:

1.     The grounded fleet at the airline customers has to be upgraded.

2.     The undelivered fleet has to be upgraded and to be delivered.

3.     Reacting to the potential A320neo++ would lead to the B737MAX being a non-seller

4.     The MAX is MAXed out: without a new wing, a complete new, longer undercarriage and larger bypass engines (from the A320neo) the B737MAX could not compete against the A320neo++. But would that make sense? No, then a complete new aircraft would be needed. Means another $15bn to be found somewhere, meanwhile back the $25bn bonds. Not easy…

So far for my theory…

The Bombardier-Airbus CSeries deal

I think it is not overstated when I say the last week changed the landscape of civil aircraft manufactures for years and probably decades to come.

The deal between Bombardier and Airbus that most likely from 2019 onwards lets the CSeries to be a majority owned Airbus product has the potential to influence how the product landscape will look like in 2030. And that includes the products that will be there and also that will NOT be there.

Let's image two things:

1. Airbus and Bombardier decide to do the "simple stretch" CS500, meaning no changes to the wing, the engines, the landing gear and the Max Takeoff Weight. That would be a roughly 2400nm aircraft with about the capacity of the A320(neo), but with significantly lower empty weight and thus lower trip costs for the typical ranges of up to 800nm. The (official) launch could come by early 2019, after the expected closing of the deal. EIS could then be in 2022 or 2023.
2. Airbus will adopt much of the cockpit and avionic technologies from the CSeries described here by Björn Fehrm for the A320neo (+, ++ or whatever it is called then) and also scale the wing for an A322. Development of the wing could also start in 2019 with an EIS maybe 2024, leapfrogging the potential Boeing NMA.

That would leave Boeing with a big problem: they are in the middle of defining their NMA, or "Middle of the Market" aircraft. But with these potential developments from Airbus&Bombardier Boeing's B737MAX product line just would not be competitive enough. Boeing would have to react to that and instead of launching the NMA with an earliest possible EIS of 2025 they would have to focus on a B737 replacement first

Although a A322 would not be the perfect "Middle of the Market" aircraft it could take away to many sales from the Boeing NMA to let the business case look unattractive. And the shrinking market share in the mich larger traditional narrowbody segment would drain on the cash flow.

So this past week has the chance of really becoming a defining moment...

A320neo deliveries

Reuters reports that August (as well as full year) deliveries for the A320neo are disrupted by slow deliveries of PW's PW1100G. The goal is to deliver about 200 A320neo this year, only 78 have been delivered by the end of August.
That deliveries with the PW1100G are slow and delayed is not particulary new. Not mentioned in the article though is the fact that alos deliveries with CFM's LEAP-1A slowed down in the last two months. After delivering 10 A320neo with the LEAP-1A in June, there were 6 in July and 7 in August. For the PW1100G the numbers are 1 for June,  3 in July and 3 in August.
An indication for future delivieries is are the numbers of first flights with the respective engines:
In June 12 A320neo with the LEAP-1A made their first flights, then 5 in July and only 3 in August.
For the PW1100G the numbers are 0 in June, 4 in July and 8 in August.
So it looks like the situation at PW gets (at least) a little bit better, but worse for CFM.

CFM A321neo noise levels revised

Yesterday the EASA published new noise levels for the A321neo, which now include the "right" noise levels for the A321-251N and A321-253N, fitted with the CFM LEAP-1A engines. As for the A320neo, the A321neo with the LEAP-1A is a little bit better (read_less noisy) than the PW1100G. This is surprising, as P&W always claimed that the GTF concept has, beside better fuel burn, it's merits in extreme low noise because of the slower spinning fan and the better damping of the low pressure turbine noise due to better atmospheric dampening.
I would be interested to hear how P&W and CFM explain the difference...

A320neo and A321neo noise levels

Yesterday the A321neo with the CFM LEAP-1A32 engine was certified by both the EASA and the FAA. The EASA certification document for the aircraft family can be accessed here, the noise certification document is here. The FAA documentation is not online yet.

What strikes me is the high noise level of the A321-251N. The LEAP-powered A321neo is not really less noisy than the CFM56 powered A321ceo, which itself was considerably louder than the V2500 powered A321ceo.

If you compare the highest MTOW version (93.5t) you get a cumulated noise level of 281.7dB for the A321-251N, the A321ceo with the  CFM56-5B4/3 is certified with a noise level of 280.1dB (there are also versions of the CFM56 which have higher noise levels than the LEAP1A though.

The PW1133G in comparison has a cumulated noise level of 268.5dB, more than 13dB less than the LEAP-1A32. Both at the lateral and flyover noise points the GTF is less noisy by about 6dB, the approach noise, where the aircraft itself is the main source, is almost the same for both versions.

I wonder if the values for the LEAP-1A32 are real – or somebody at EASA put some wrong numbers in the document.

The noise values for the A320neo are telling a complete different picture: here, the LEAP powered A320-251N is better than the PW1127G powered A320-271N by 1dB, mainly through lower levels at the lateral noise point.


I wait for some good explanations...

A320neo start-up times

The hype was huge when the problem around longer start-up times of the PW1100G-JM went public. Indigo stated that the ~2min. extra time that it took to start up the engines would threaten their Business model as a low cost carrier with high utilization and short turn around times between flights. As I showed in an earlier post this was not very plausible from the beginning. But at airports with tight infrastructure (Frankfurt comes to my mind) it could cause some headache - more for the airport than for the individual airline though - as, if one aircraft blocks the way to the gates as it has to wait until the engines are started, other aircraft have to wait.
Believing what Airbus, P&W and Lufthansa said recently the problem is largely gone now.
Now we can read in a report from airwaysmag about the first revenue flight onboard on the first Frontier A320neo that the that the competing LEAP-1A engine has a "noticeably long startup time". What that exactly means we don't know yet. There was nothing official about that yet, showing once again that the PR Folks at GE, CFM and Safran are doing a much better job than those at P&W.
But maybe someone should tell Qatar Airways CEO Al Akbar about it as the LEAP-1B should "suffer" the same problem before he confirms his order for the B737MAX. Or maybe he already counts on compensations...?

The CFM LEAP LPC issue

For the first time CFM acknowledged, though not directly but through Boeing's B737MAX chief engineer Michael Teal, that the CFM LEAP-1B has an issue with the stall margin of the LPC. This was widely known in the industry for months now and in online forums like airliners.net were some hints to that issue. It is alos clear, that not only the LEAP-1B

A320neo engines compared

Recently, in March, CFM revised their certification documentation for the LEAP-1A engine. There now is a G02 version and Addison Schonland from AirInsight already explained the differences between the original G01 certification standard and the G02.

The higher stated weight of the G02 is due to the fact that the EBU is now included in the weight. If we now look at the documentation of the competing PW1100G-JM engine from P&W we see that the EBU is included in it’s weight also.

The weight of the PW1100G-JM is 2857.6 kg or 6300 lbs.

The weight of the LEAP-1A (G02) is 3153 kg or 6936 lbs.

 

Indigo business model threatened by PW1100G?

Yesterday I read that Indigo sees their business model threatened by the engines of their A320neo – because of  the longer start-up times of the PW1100G (dependent on how long the engine was out after shutdown) the aircraft has to wait up to 2 min. longer with their engines at idle before the aircraft can begin to roll and taxi for takeoff.

Now let’s have a look if there is anything in this claim by looking at how Indigo actually operates their aircraft:

According to flightradar24 the 3^rd A320neo (VT-ITA) flew on May 2^nd from Delhi to Nagpur. The aircraft landed perfectly on time at 3:40am (UTC). It took off again 52 minutes later, 7 minutes later than scheduled but early enough to arrive back in Delhi 4 min. ahead of the scheduled arrival at 5:56am.

The 2^nd leg of the day went to Bangalore with a scheduled departure at 7:30am (actual departure time 7:55am). The aircraft arrived Bangalore 3 min. ahead of schedule at 10:17am. Scheduled departure back to Delhi was at 11:15am, which was missed by 9 min. Arrival in Delhi then was 5 min. ahead of schedule at 13:50am.

So we can see no delays stemming from the start-up times. The 2 min. longer start-up time is an the maximum, which only occurs when the engine was off for about 2.5 hours. But turn-around times for the two legs was below one hour, so the extra start-up time should be

Why I don't believe In MoM...

In the last couple of weeks a new discussion about the so-called „Middle of the Market“ or “MoM” aircraft broke out. Apart from that nobody really knows what this aircraft should look like (B757 successor or B767 successor or both, narrowbody or widebody, scalable to cover the B737 market or not?) or every potential customer wanting something different, I do not really believe in the launch of such an aircraft in the near future.

Why?

Airbus has no interest in such an aircraft. They have a good market position with their A321neo, especially the LR version and the future A330-800, although I don’t foresee large order volumes for that aircraft. For sure Airbus is studying the MoM, but (for now) for the pure purpose of looking into what Boeing could do and if and how Airbus would have to react to it.

Boeing would be the one to launch such an aircraft. But do they have to do it? Although the B737MAX has less orders than the A320neo, the amount of orders the B737MAX got is massive. The B737MAX8 is right in the sweet spot of the market and has a small advantage in costs per seat against the A320neo – if the LEAP-1B engine performs as advertised, what remains to be seen.

The B737MAX8 just had it’s first flight. the –MAX9 and the –MAX7 have to follow. So why unsettle your (potential) customers talking too much and eventually launching a new aircraft that would at least partly overlap with the B737MAX family?

Also, Boeing will probably feel a drop in cash flow during the transition of the B777 Classic to the B777X between 2020 and 2022, just when the MoM would need large sums of money for R&D spending.

But there is another aspect why I do not believe in a launch of MoM for a, say, 2024 entry

A320neo with PW1127G-JM certified!

Two important milestones for the A320neo program in one week: last week the LEAP-1A and the identical -1C) got it’s certification, both from the FAA and the EASA.  Today, the A320neo got it’s Type Certificate with the PW1100G-JM. The road to EIS is now free and we can expect that the first aircraft will be delivered until the end of the year, almost exactly 5 years after Airbus announced the A320neo on Dec. 1^st, 2010.

The A320neo has about 4500 firm orders today, enough backlog for 7-8 years of production.

Now the suppliers, first and foremost the engine suppliers have to show that they can meet the ramp up. This will be no easy Task!

In my last post I wrote that there is a significant downturn in flying time of the two A320neo equipped with the LEAP-1A. Since then it even got worse. In the last week, there was only one flight from the D-AVVB, the 2^nd LEAP-1A prototype. The week before also saw less

A320neo flight test program

After Airbus launched the A320neo program on Dec. 1^st, 2010 we are now close to entry into service, with Qatar Airways as the first customer. After several - say - hick-ups in the test program it now looks as the PW1100G powered version is successfully completing the last steps in the certification program. The third aircraft with the GTF engines, an aircraft that will be delivered to Indigo later, joined the test fleet and is doing Function and Reliability testing. There were two hick-ups there two, one in Thessaloniki, were the aircraft was on ground for several days and another in Kiruna, were the aircraft flew back two days later.

A320neo and B737MAX market shares

Boeing had a press release yesterday announcing the first B737MAX is now in the final assembly. First flight is expected in early 2016. Bjorn Fehrm writes here about the timing of EIS of the new or reengined narrowbodies and regionals (he is not right on one thing though: the first flight of the A320neo was NOT late by 6 months).What becomes clear (well, as of now...) is that the B737MAX will enter Airline Service earlier than previously thought. This is also backed from Alaska Airlines, which expects the first B737MAX-8 now in late 2017 rather in early 2018.

There is always a lot of "discussion" between Airbus and Boeing about the market share of the A320neo vs. the B737MAX. Airbus maintains to argue that the A320neo has a market share of 60% where Boeing also consistently says that in the long run market shares will be

A320neo testing running out of time for EIS 2015?

Yesterday Flightglobal reported that this year Boeing could, for the first time since 2001, deliver more narrowbodies than Airbus. Boeing delivered 243 civil B737 plus 6 for the US Navy until June 30, Airbus delivered 238 A320. Although normally Airbus delivers more aircraft in the second half of the year (H1 2014: 237, H2 2014: 253) and Boeing had also more deliveries in the first half o f 2014 (239), it will be hard for Airbus to beat Boeing this year. This has to do with the transition to the A320neo, where production times should be a little bit longer initially than for the A320ceo.
Also it is questionable if all planned A320neo deliveries in 2015 will be handed over this year. This is highly dependent on when flight testing with the PW1100G will restart and if there are no more hickups in the flight testing.The Flightglobal article suggests that flight tests will start once the now delivered  engines are podded to the nacelles and integrated into the aircraft. This might be at the end of July. The last flight of a PW1100G powered A320neo happened on April 30th, so three months would be lost by then.
Airbus so far insists that deliveries will start towards the end of the year as planned. With the original first delivery targeted for the end of October, there must have been ample margin in the original flight test program or Airbus has to accelerate testing once the aircraft are back in the air.
But also the CFM LEAP-1A powered first A320neo has not been in the air for two weeks now. We don't know yet what is the reason here, if it is engine or aircraft related (although I would be very surprised if it has anything to do with the airframe). So any learning from the CFM powered aircraft that is transferable to the PW powered aircraft is delayed also.
The margin is getting shorter everyday, and Qatar Airways Akbar Al Baker alias U-Turn Al is probably already thinking about how he can make his "fun" out of the situation.

Is there a China Narrowbody Order Gap?

Looking at data from ASCEND there is a gap in narrowbody orders from some chinese airlines. Look at China Eastern for example: before they announced to order 50 more B737NG for delivery between 2017 and 2019 their last four B737NG deliveries were scheduled for early 2017. So there would have been a delivery stream gap before China Eastern would get their first of 60 B737MAX in larger numbers.
The same can be said for other chinese airlines:

• Shandong, Shenzen and Xiamen all get their last B737NG this year. Xiamen already announced orders for 70 more B737NG and B737MAX and it could already be included as one from an "Unidentified Customer"
• China Southern also gets their last B737NG this year, so either they also have new orders in place as an "Unidentified Customer" or they will order soon
• Air China ran dry of new deliveries for B737NG's and does not have any (official) order for B737MAX

The same can be said - more or less - for Airbus.
Air China and Shenzen already announced orders for a mix of 100 A320ceo & A320neo and I guess it is already in the books as part of the "undisclosed".
The same is true for China Eastern (70 A320neo) and China Southern (50 A320neo & 30 A320ceo). Some of the A320ceo aircraft subsequently trickled from the "undisclosed" to the China Eastern line of the Airbus O&D sheet. The same is true for Spring and Loong. Spring long ago announced to order 30 more A320ceo and they already might have ordered the A320neo. Also you can see some changes at Tibet Airlines.
The order for 60 A320neo from an "undisclosed asian customer" announced at the Paris Air Show might also be from China. 

Bottom line: the most of the "Unidentified" or "Undisclosed" customers should be chinese airlines. There are probably not much more narrowbody orders to expect in the next few years.

CFM LEAP-1B missing SFC

The revelation by Aspire Aviation about the performance shortfalls of the CFM LEAP engine family did not came totally unexpected. Rumours have been around for a long time. But the severity of the shortfall in the LEAP-1B engine is somewhat shocking, at least for Boeing customers. The shortfall of 2% in the case of the LEAP-1A is relatively unspectacular: the shortfalls of recent engines at EIS like the GEnx and the Trent 1000 were higher. A shortfall of 2% can be corrected with a suitable performance improvement program (PIP), but a