A320 deliveries ahead of NEO

There is a lot of speculation if deliveries of the "classic" A320 will fall in 2014-2015 in anticipation of the A320NEO. Both Boeing and Airbus meanwhile are talking about accelerating deliveries - Airbus is thinking about up to 44 aircraft a month, up from the current rate of 36 and the planned rate of 40 for next year. Boeing will also increase it's output rate of the B737 line to 40 per month.
One could argue that in the case of Airbus the rate hike will only last a year, before airlines will start to negotiate conversions for deliveries close to the NEO EIS from the "Classic" to the NEO. One argument that can be heard is that deliveries of the B737 Classic plummeted from 218 in 1992 to just 76 in 1996 - but the 737NG entered airline service in 1998 and in 1997 deliveries increased again. Please read this article from 1997. Even CFMI was suprised by the large number of orders for the CFM56-3, the engine of the 737 Classic.
I think tthe ups and down in aircraft production are more related to the world economy than to the appearance of new aircraft. If the economy is thriving, aircaft deliveries will do so, too - with a time delay of one or two years as the manufacturers and suppliers cannot ramp up and down their production in days.
You can see the relationship in the chart I put together. It shows narrowbody deliveries from Boeing (B737 family) and Airbus (A320, family; sorry, I did not implement the B717 nor the B757). Then I looked up the world GDP growth rates. What you can see is that dips in deliveries always come after the GDP growth has had a low.
1. Through 1991 and 1993 world GDP growth was flat at 2%. Deliveries subsequently fell from around 350 to less than 150 in 1995 and 1996. GDP growth recovered starting in 1994 and stayed reached a high of almost 5% in 2000 with a small dent in 1998 due to the asian crisis. Deliveries soared to around 550 per year between 1999 and 2001. The boom came to a sudden stop due to 9/11.
2. In 2001 the internet bubble burst from 2000 reached the ecomomy. The economic crisis was sharpened by 9/11, leading to a lack of new orders for aircraft (apart from Ryanir). Deliveries fell back to a low of around 400 in 2003 before bouncing back, as the global economy recovered starting in 2003 with growth rates exceeding 5% in 2006.

Many "experts" thought that as a consequence to the financial and economic crisis starting with the Lehman Brothers bankruptcy aircraft deliveries would have to fall at least as dramatically as after 9/11. But this time  neither Airbus nor Boeing were forced to cut delivery rates of their narrowbody families. The reason is that, different than during the 90's of early 2000's, the emerging economies, especially in Asia are now a much more powerful part of the global economy and air traffic was growing in these countries even in 2008 and 2009.

It will depend on the world economy if delivery rates for the A320 Classic will dramatically fall in 2014 and 2015. But as in Asia air traffic is still growing and will do so for many years, I believe that even a small dip in the world GDP growth would not harm the A320 Classic deliveries too much. There are too many carriers like Tiger Airways, Jetstar, AirAsia, who need aircraft badly to satisfy demand.

Boeing creating a new market?

Air Transport World today reports that Buckingham Research expects Boeing to forego reengining the 737NG, a move still anticipated by a "meaningful number of investors" in the case that a Boeing customer would defect to Airbus.
But Buckingham noted that Boeing might be so capacity constrained in terms of orders that it might not have the possibility to reengine.
Instead of reengining Boeing would move to an all new aircraft, probably a new light twin-aisle. As I laid out before, such an aircraft would not make sense starting in the current lower capacity end of the 737, so I would guess (if true) that this aircraft would start where the 737-800 is today. The upper end then could be where the  757-300 is, just below the 787-8. That would then fill a niche, because today there are no new aircraft build in this segment - well, one could consider the Tu-204, but this aircraft is almost dead and even not competitive with the 757.
Buckingham says that Boeing would continue to improve the 737NG and is internally convinced that the 2016 737NG is competitive with the A320neo. Boeing earlier stated that the 737NG line could be open until 2026.
A move described by Buckingham would be both smart and risky:

• Risky as it is not clear if customers really will think that a more than 40 year old design will be competitive. Until then the CSeries is in the market, a similar Embraer aircraft could be on the way to the market, making the 737-700 obsolete - the backlog of the -700 is shrinking anyway (as well as the A319). The cabin diameter will still be the 737's problem, as people tend to get larger - vertically, but even worse: horizontally.
• Smart as it opens a new market field for Boeing and by that getting out of the competition with Bombardier, Embraer, the Chinese, the Russians and, to some extent, Airbus. Although for now it remains unclear if the new aircraft will have transcontinental or transatlantic range, the aircraft could be (with the right level of technology) better than the A321neo even if it is designed for more range to enable all 757 missions flown today.

But is there a huge market for these aircraft? At the lower end for sure, as the 737-800 shows - but there would be the problem. If I have two aircraft in my shop, which one should I sell the customer. The same problem appeared when Boeing bought McDonnell Douglas and the MD-95 became the B717. The B717 had to die, as it was a stand-alone aircraft, not part of a family - Boeing sold the 737-600 to SAS although the B717 would have been much better in costs for the SAS missions.
And what about Southwest, by far the largest Boeing customer today? They just ordered the 737-800, but all of their other (500+) aircraft have less than 150 seats and they also like the B717 as an addition with even lower capacity. I cannot imagine Southwest going to an all 180+ seater fleet in the future just to keep being a Boeing customer. And I cannot imagine that incremental improvements to the 737-700 are enough to keep them from defecting to Bombardier (they might one day decide to build a CS500, although saying differently, Embraer or even Airbus.
There were "just" about 757's build - for sure Boeing counts on creating a new big market segment when they really build that small twin-aisle. The question is, if that market segment will be there when the aircraft appears...

737 successor Part IV

In early March I wrote the first piece of this story and explained why I think that a "small widebody" seems unlikely as a 737 successor aircraft.
Hearing Boeing CEO McNerney at the conference call on Wednesday kind of confirms that. He said that the next new airplane will probably first address “the heart of the market,” which is 145 to 185 seats, McNerney said. “Which is not to say that we will leave the (7)57 space unaddressed at all.” (quoted from the seattle.pi blog).
So Boeing clearly will not back away from the "Southwest Airlines" market, which is (as of today) the lower end of that bandwidth, but SWA just this year also ordered their first batch of B737-800, representing the upper end of that "heart of the market".
Not leaving the 757 space unaddressed means they also plan to have an aircraft in the family with 200+ seats. But this would lead to a competitive disadvantage on the lower end, if all family members would have the same wing. If the 200+ seater should have a transatlantic range, the wing has to be considerably larger than today's 737NG wing. That would burden the 145 seat family member with a wing that is too large and too heavy. Trim drag would have to be used during cruise to keep the aircraft flying in level flight with the desired speed, as the large wing produces too much lift - alternatively the aircraft could fly slower, burning less fuel, but cutting productivity.
And by the time the new Boeing aircaft arrives, there could be, apart from the CSeries, another narrowbody - optimised for around 150 seats and probably lower range than the ~3000nm CSeries: a new 5 abreast aircraft from Embraer. With around 2200nm as today's EJets, a specific version of the GTF, the LEAP-X or even a new engine from RR, it could be better than the CSeries and the new Boeing aircraft.

Boeing of course could produce two wings - one for the lower end of the market and one for the upper end - in case of the 787 that strategy failed, but for reasons that do not apply in the narrowbody sector.

About the timing McNerney said:  “You’ll hear more from us at the end of the year.”
So, as I wrote in the third part of the story, we will obviously not hear anything spectacular from Boeing at the Paris Air Show - only a "guidance", probably further emphasizing that they lean towards an all new airplane, but not ruling out a reengining at all.

The first three parts of the story are here:
Part I
Part II
Part III

COC and DOC Part III

Today I discovered a very interesting website: The "Airline Data Project" from MIT.
There is a lot of airline data from all major american airlines in that database. From that data you can easily pull DOC and COC's and compare airline to airline, a specific airline though the years or whatever you want to find out.
Let us have a look at two typical carriers:

• American Airlines as the typical legacy carrier
• Southwest Airlines as the typical low cost carrier

I looked at two years - the first available (1995) and the one with the highest fuel prices (2008).
In 1995 the price for aircraft fuel was relatively stable at about $0.50 per gallon - unbelievably low for us today.
Im early 2008 the price already was in the region of $2.70, then climbing to almost $4.50 in July before falling rapidly to a low of about $1.00 in December 2008.

Here is the chart for American Airlines in 1995.

The cost for fuel and oil is $429 per block hour - 26% of the total cost.

We get a whole different picture for the year 2008.

Now American Airlines has to pay $2771 per block hour for fuel - a stunning 60% of the total, although the amount of fuel consumed per block hour went down from 957 to 940 gallons. This only slight decline in fuel burn shows why American now accelerated their B737-800 deliveries in the last two years. The MD-80 is fuel thirsty.

And now here is Southwest Airlines. The trend is the same:

In 1995 fuel cost were at 30% of direct operating costs. But the dollar value is about 13% less than the $492 paid by AA, as Southwest just burned 773 gallons per block hour and the total costs per flight hour were 14% lower at SWA.

And here are the SWA numbers for 2008:

 Fuel and oil costs are above 50%, but total costs are less than 60% of the costs of AA. Fuel burn per block hour was down by 9% compared to 1995 at 705 gallons, the rest of the difference is probably explainable by better fuel hedging at SWA.

I think from these charts we can understand the desire from many airlines to get more fuel efficient aircraft as soon as possible.

COC and DOC Part II

Airbus offers a "A320neo Fact Sheet on it's website for download here.
Apart from one obvious typo - the A321 is mentioned as the 2nd variant to become available, but that has changed to the A319 as the 2nd family member recently, there are a few "facts" - or claims- on that sheet that compare cash operating costs compared to today's A320 and the fuel burn of the A320neo with the B737-800W and the CS300. These can be compared to my assumptions made in a recent blog entry called "COC and DOC".

First claim: A320neo has 8% better cash operating costs than today's A320.
Fact check: In the recent blog entry I assumed 9.5% better cash operating costs for a fuel price of $3.00/gallon - 7.5% from lower fuel burn and about 2% from lower maintenance costs. With oil prices in the range of $3.20 as of today, cash operating costs are more like 10% better - so Airbus is not overly optimistic with the 8% assumption.

Second claim: A320neo has 16% less fuel burn per seat than the 737-800W.
Fact check: Assuming 15% reduced fuel burn per trip through the sharklets and the new engines and three more seats, the overall improvement in fuel burn per seat is (153/150)*15%= 15.3%.
If Airbus says that the A320neo is 16% better in fuel burn per seat than the B737-800W it implies that the A320 today would be 0.7% better than the B737-800W. I assmued they are on par, but I guess a difference of 0.7% does not really count.

Third claim: A320neo has the same fuel burn (per seat is obviously meant, though not stated) as the CS300.
Fact check: Let's assume 153 seats on the A320neo and 130 seats for the CS300 in a comparable cabin layout and the same seat pitch. This is a difference of 17.7%, so the fuel burn per trip can be 17.7% higher for the A320neo in order to have the same fuel burn per pax.
A report from AirInsight (The Business case for the CSeries) from last year has some fuel burn numbers. Without knowing exactly how accurate these are and also keeping in mind that AirInsight assumed 158 seats from the A320neo, let's have a look at them:
For a 500nm mission, AirInsight gets a fuel burn of

• 805 gallons for the CS300
• 910 gallons for the A320neo

The absolute difference is just 13%, so that the fuel burn per seat would be even lower for the A320neo. For a longer misson the relative difference should get a little bit larger though.

But a larger aircraft should burn less per pax anyway -so although the claim is OK as a fact, it only shows that the smaller CS300 is a step ahead - and the A319neo cannot compete on a per seat basis as it is comparable in seat capacity but a lot heavier.

Bottom line: Airbus is not making any false statements here -  but the facts presented are no new and eye-watering arguments...