The speculations about the official launch of a stretched A220 comes up again at regular intervals. Airbus position is that it is not a question if it will be launched bot only when…
Next spring
at the latest, in the run-up to the Paris Air Show, speculation about a launch
at the show will be rampant again. So let's start early, say now... what are
the reasons for or against a stretched A220, what options are there in terms of
engines and what could that mean for the A320neo and B737MAX successors?
To launch
or not to launch?
What speaks
for a stretched A220? Let's start with what no longer speaks against it: the
A320neo. In the past, the popularity, the number of open orders and the
profitability (for Airbus) for the A320neo were cited as the main economic
obstacles to the launch of the A320neo. As soon as the A220 Stretch is
announced, customers would cancel the A320neo and order the A220 instead, which
is significantly more expensive to manufacture (today). However, if you look at
Airbus' current order backlog, over 70% of the open orders for the A320 family
are for the A321neo. The A321neo accounts for 87% of orders from 2024. The
importance of the A320neo for Airbus has declined significantly in recent years
and the A321neo is even more profitable to sell than the A320neo.
The next
reason in favor of a launch could just as well be one against it: Boeing's
situation! Boeing is still busy getting the B737MAX-7 and especially the Boeing
737MAX-10 certified by the FAA, EASA, etc. - and also the B777-9, whose EIS has
just been postponed again. It is questionable whether Boeing can even provide
enough resources for the certification issues while at the same time having to
deal with general quality issues and now also with the strike of its unionized
employees (a new offer from Boeing is out and the vote is expected in the coming
week). A ramp-up of B737MAX-8 and -9 production is currently not in sight and
the B787 has its own problems. Boeing will therefore lack cash flow in the next
few years and the company must now urgently mobilize money on the capital
market. Boeing bonds could soon have junk status. Two very different
conclusions could be drawn from this situation:
a) Pro: Airbus
is launching the stretched A220 to put the B737MAX-8 under even more pressure.
This would force Boeing, if they were financially able to do so, to launch a
successor to the B737MAX family earlier than planned. Currently, the optimal
time window for a launch would be after the end of the analysis of the X-66
flights, which
are currently scheduled to launch in 2028. After the first series of
flights, for which the GTF engine of the A220 and Embraer E2 will power the
aircraft, the
CFM RISE engine may also be tested with the X-66. Boeing would then have a
real comparison of the installation effects. But not before 2030! An early
start to the development of a B737MAX successor by Airbus would deprive Boeing
of many options, the solution would probably be a traditional
"tube-and-wing" aircraft with an advanced LEAP engine and/or a PWA
GTF or Rolls Royce Ultrafan variant. For Airbus, this would have the advantage
of being able to wait a few years, analyze the Boeing design and meanwhile evaluate
the CFM RISE engine in flight tests earlier (currently planned
from 2026). This would give Airbus and the engine manufacturers more time to
prepare additional technology. However, this is exactly where the first
sticking point comes in: are the engine manufacturers prepared to develop two
different engines in a relatively short period of time? Do they have the
resources for this? Do they see a business case? It could end up with the engine
manufacturers demanding a "single source" solution from Boeing,
because Boeing's market share compared to Airbus would probably continue to
decline.
b) Contra:
from a market share perspective, Airbus has no reason to invest in the
development of an A220 Stretch. The market share of the A320neo has grown
steadily compared to the B737MAX in recent years, and Boeing can not and does
not want to afford to launch a successor. Airbus can therefore sit back, relax
and wait until Boeing takes the first step, perhaps in the early 2030s, and
counter it after carefully analyzing the Boeing design.
These two
scenarios have very different effects on the engine manufacturers.
In scenario
a) the most likely engine variant is a further development of the PW1500G
engine, similar to the further development of the PW1100G engine into the GTF
Advantage. CFM, on the other hand, would probably have to make a completely new
development for the A220 Stretch, as the LEAP-1B is significantly heavier and
has a worse SFC than the PW1500G. It would be difficult to build a sound business
case here, especially as some of the sales for the A220 Stretch would be no
extra sales, but just drawn from the B737MAX.
What
consequences would a A220 Stretch launch have for Airbus? I think that it will
not be a "simple stretch": firstly, Airbus will use the opportunity
to integrate further detailed improvements, e.g. further developed winglets,
which can then also be used on the A220-100 and -300. But I think the question
of whether the way the aircraft is produced will change is much more important.
At present, it is not yet clear how a production rate of 10 aircraft per month
could be achieved in Mirabel. The so-called pre
FAL, which Airbus built in Mirabel after taking over the program based on
the A320 line in Hamburg, has not led to a significant increase in production
even two years later; currently only 4-5 aircraft per month are being started
for assembly.
If demand
for the A320neo does indeed fall further with the release of the A220 Stretch,
it should be possible, for example, to convert one of the existing A320 lines
in Hamburg, Toulouse or Mobile to the A220 and at the same time optimize the
entire production process. This would also enhance profitability of the A220
program.
What about
the consequences for Boeing? This depends on the exact positioning of the A220
Stretch: if it is placed close enough to the capacity of the B737MAX-8, Boeing
would have to react as described under a). As described, this would come too
early for the CFM RISE, the aircraft would probably (obviously) get a second
generation LEAP engine and possibly a second option. But here lies the problem:
would Pratt & Whitney or Rolls Royce be prepared to invest in a completely
new development, knowing that a few years later Airbus would demand an engine
that is significantly better in response, and perhaps if development has
progressed far enough by then? This makes it clear that Boeing is in a dilemma.
But there
could be a solution that - ironically - was close to completion a few years ago
and was then shortsightedly discarded: this solution would be Embraer. A few
days ago, Embraer CEO Francisco Gomes Neto confirmed that Embraer is (once
again) considering developing a "big
narrowbody". A new attempt at a merger between the commercial aircraft
division of Embraer and BCA would have the advantage for Boeing that it would
be able to face a competitor to the potential A220 Stretch without Boeing
having to decide on the design and technology of the real successor to the
B737MAX family. An Embraer/BCA narrowbody could initially cover the field above
the E195E2 up to the (then) A220 Stretch. This would keep the market share
large enough from Boeing's point of view.
Scenario b)
is much easier, especially for the engine manufacturers. All have enough time
to work on the next generation of aircraft and engines. The option for an
Embraer/Boeing Joint Venture would be there as well. But that would most likely
concentrate on the lower end of the narrowbodies and then maybe “force” Airbus
t launch the A220 Stretch.
Speculation
of course, all just speculation... but all major suppliers, but above all the
engine manufacturers, must or should deal with all variants and prepare for
them.
The Paris
Air Show 2025 begins on Monday, June 16, 2025, and we will know more about how
the story (of the narrowbodies) continues by Friday, June 20, 2025 at the
latest.